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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 11-1635 
_______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
DEVLON SAUNDERS, 
A/K/A Dev, A/K/A Shawn, 
 
        Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 1-10-cr-00054-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane  
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 23, 2012 
_______________ 
 
Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  January 30, 2012) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Devlon Saunders pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute, and possession with the 
intent to distribute, 50 or more grams of cocaine base and marijuana in violation of 21 
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U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846.  The plea agreement that he signed included a waiver of his right 
to appeal.  Saunders’s initial Presentence Report recommended a term of imprisonment 
of 360 months to life based on computations under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines.  However, his appointed counsel briefed and argued myriad objections to that 
recommendation.  The District Court accepted most of counsel’s arguments and 
sentenced Saunders to 180 months’ imprisonment, three years’ supervised release, and a 
fine and assessment of $1,100.  Saunders now appeals his sentence. 
 Saunders’s attorney moves to withdraw as counsel under Anders v. California, 386 
U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that all potential grounds for appeal are frivolous.  Saunders 
has not filed a pro se brief.  We grant the motion and affirm Saunders’s sentence.1
I. 
  
 Because we write solely for the parties, we recite only those facts necessary to our 
decision.  In March 2010, a sealed indictment was filed against Saunders and 
codefendants.  It charged them with three counts: (1) conspiracy to distribute, and 
possession with intent to distribute, 50 or more grams of cocaine base and marijuana in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846; (2) distribution, and possession with intent to 
distribute, 50 or more grams of cocaine base and marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841; and (3) use of a communication facility to facilitate a drug trafficking offense in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 
18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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 In May 2010, Saunders, through his appointed counsel, filed motions to suppress 
evidence with supporting briefs.  Plea negotiations continued, and Saunders signed his 
plea agreement the following month.  He pled guilty only to Count One, the conspiracy 
charge.  After he waived his right to appear before a District Judge, a Magistrate Judge 
conducted a guilty plea hearing. 
 After the District Court accepted Saunders’s guilty plea, it ordered a Presentence 
Report.  That Report calculated a criminal offense level of 41 and a criminal history 
category of VI under the Sentencing Guidelines.  Saunders’s counsel objected to the 
Presentence Report based on the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, the propriety of a gun use 
enhancement, and the status of Saunders’s criminal history, among other issues.  As 
noted, at the sentencing hearing the District Court resolved most of these issues in 
Saunders’s favor, App. at 92-120, and imposed a sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment.  
This sentence was within the Guidelines range of 168 to 210 months that the Court 
deemed appropriate. 
II. 
 At the outset, it appears that Saunders has waived his right to appeal, as his plea 
agreement contained an appeal waiver.  We “retain[] subject matter jurisdiction over the 
appeal by a defendant who ha[s] signed an appellate waiver.”  United States v. Gwinnett, 
483 F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 2007).  However, “we will not exercise that jurisdiction to 
review the merits of [Saunders’s] appeal if we conclude that []he knowingly and 
voluntarily waived [his] right to appeal unless the result would work a miscarriage of 
justice.”  Id.  In this case, the Magistrate Judge conducted a thorough colloquy in which 
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Saunders confirmed that his waiver was knowing and voluntary.  App. at 73-75.  There is 
no suggestion that he lacks capacity or that there were procedural defects.  Lacking any 
indication of a miscarriage of justice, it is not necessary that we exercise jurisdiction here. 
 Even if we were to do so, this appeal would fail under our Anders standard.  Our 
rules provide that “[w]here, upon review of the district court record, trial counsel is 
persuaded that the appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit, counsel may file a 
motion to withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders.”  3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a).  
If we concur with trial counsel’s assessment, we “will grant [the] Anders motion, and 
dispose of the appeal without appointing new counsel.”  Id.  Accordingly, our inquiry is 
“twofold: (1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled the rule’s requirements; and (2) 
whether an independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”  United 
States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 In his Anders brief, Saunders’s counsel identifies two potential grounds for appeal: 
the procedural and substantive reasonableness of Saunders’s sentence.  Our review of the 
record confirms counsel’s assessment that there are no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. 
 No doubt we review Saunders’s sentence for procedural and substantive 
reasonableness.  See United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 215 (3d Cir. 2009).  The 
District Court correctly calculated the advisory Guidelines range, addressing the 
arguments of Saunders’s counsel.  Finding for Saunders on many issues, the Court 
reduced the recommended offense level from 41 to 31 and the recommended criminal 
history category from VI to V.  Its ultimate sentence of 180 months was on the low side 
of the Guidelines range of 168 to 210 months and just half of the minimum of the range 
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initially recommended, 360 months to life.  In addition, the District Court gave due 
thought to the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  It considered the 
difficulty of Saunders’s home environment, the seriousness of his offense conduct, and 
the adequacy of deterrence.  App. at 116-17.  Taken together, this is sufficient “to ensure 
that a substantively reasonable sentence has been imposed in a procedurally fair way.”  
United States v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592, 599 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. 
Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
 Counsel adequately fulfilled the requirements of Anders.  Because our 
independent review of the record fails to reveal any nonfrivolous ground for appeal, we 
will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm Saunders’s sentence. 
 
